Galilei, Galileo, The systems of the world, 1661

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1ſwer, that of infinite one part is not greater than another, ſince

both are infinite; nor can it be ſaid, that of the infinite number,
an hundred thouſand is a greater part than two, though that be
fifty thouſand times greater than this; and if to the moving of
the Univerſe there be required a finite power, though very great
in compariſon of that which ſufficeth to move the Earth onely;
yet is there not implied therein a greater part of the infinite power,
nor is that part leſſe infinite which remaineth unimploy'd.
So that
to apply unto a particular effect, a little more, or a little leſſe
power, importeth nothing; beſides that the operation of ſuch
vertue, hath not for its bound or end the Diurnal Motion onely;
but there are ſeveral other motions in the World, which we
know of, and many others there may be, that are to us unknown.
Therefore if we reſpect the Moveables, and granting it as out of
queſtion, that it is a ſhorter and eaſier way to move the Earth,
than the Univerſe; and moreover, having an eye to the ſo many
other abreviations, and facilities that onely this way are to be
tained, an infallible Maxime of Ariſtotle, which he teacheth us,
that, fruſtra fit per plura, quod poteſt fieri per pauciora,
dereth it more probable that the Diurnal Motion belongs to the
Earth alone, than to the Univerſe, the Earth ſubducted.
Of infinity one
part is no bigger
than auother,
though they are
comparatively
equal.
SIMPL. In reciting that Axiom, you have omitted a ſmall
clauſe, which importeth as much as all the reſt, eſpecially in our
caſe, that is to ſay, the words æquè bene. It is requiſite therefore
to examine whether this Hypotheſis doth equally well ſatisfie in all
particulars, as the other.
SALV. The knowledg whether both theſe poſitions do æquè
bene, ſatisfie, may be comprehended from the particular
nation of the appearances which they are to ſatisfie; for hitherto
we have diſcourſed, and will continue to argue ex hypotheſi,
namely, ſuppoſing, that as to the ſatisfaction of the appearances,

both the aſſumptions are equally accomodated.
As to the clauſe
which you ſay was omitted by me, I have more reaſon to ſuſpect
that it was ſuperfluouſly inſerted by you.
For the expreſſion æquè
bene, is a relative that neceſſarily requireth two terms at leaſt,
for a thing cannot have relation to its ſelf, nor do we ſay, v. gr.
reſt to be equally good, as reſt. And becauſe, when we ſay, that
is done in vain by many means, which may be done with fewer,
we mean, that that which is to be done, ought to be the ſame
thing, not two different ones; and becauſe the ſame thing
not be ſaid to be done as well as its ſelf; therefore, the addition
of the Phraſe æquè bene is ſuperfluous, and a relation, that hath
but one term onely.
In the Axiome
Fruſtra fit per
ra, &c. the
tion of æque benè,
is ſuperfluous.
SAGR. Unleſſe you will have the ſame befal us, as did
day, let us return to our matter in hand; and let Simplicius

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