Wilkins, John - A discovery of a new world : or a discourse tending to prove, that 'tis probable there may be another Habitable World in the Moon ; with a discourse concerning the Probability of a Passage thither; unto which is added, a discourse concerning a New Planet, tending to prove, that 'tis probable our earth is one of the Planets

Wilkins, John, A discovery of a new world : or a discourse tending to prove, that 'tis probable there may be another Habitable World in the Moon ; with a discourse concerning the Probability of a Passage thither; unto which is added, a discourse concerning a New Planet, tending to prove, that 'tis probable our earth is one of the Planets

Table of contents

[Item 1.]

[2.] Ex Libris James S. Dearden Rampside

[3.] A DISCOVERY OF A New , OR,

[4.] In Two Parts.

[5.] The Fifth Edition Corrected and Amended. LONDON,

[6.] The Epiſtle to the READER.

[7.] The Propoſitions that are proved in this Diſcourſe. PROPOSITION I.

[8.] PROP. II.

[9.] PROP. III.

[10.] PROP. IV.

[11.] PROP. V.

[12.] PROP. VI.

[13.] PROP. VII.

[14.] PROP. VIII.

[15.] PROP. IX.

[16.] PROP. X.

[17.] PROP. XI.

[18.] PROP. XII.

[19.] PROP. XIII.

[20.] PROP. XIV.

[21.] The Firſt Book. That the MOON May be a WORLD. The Firſt Propoſition, by way of Preface.

[22.] Sed vanus ſtolidis hæc omnia finxerit Error.

[23.] Solis lunæq; labores.

[24.] Cum fruſtra reſonant æra auxiliaria Lunæ.

[25.] Una laboranti poterit ſuccerrere Lunæ.

[26.] Gantus & è cælo poſſunt deducere Lunam.

[27.] Cantus & ſi curru lunam deducere tentant, Et facerent, ſi non æra repulſa ſonant.

[28.] PROP. II. That a Plurality of Worlds doth not contradict any Principle of Reaſon or Faith.

[29.] Æſtuas infelix auguſto limite mundi.

[30.] PROP. III. That the Heavens do not conſiſt of any ſuch pure Matter, which can priviledge them from the like Change and Corruption, as theſe Inferiour, Bodies are liable unto.

306126That the Earth may be a Planet. 1. Though the inſtance of a Ship, may
ſerve as a proof for this opinion, it being
an Argument, a minori ad majus, from an ac-
cidental Motion, to a natural; yet it will
not ſerve againſt it. For though it were
not thus in accidental Motions, yet this
would not hinder but that it might be ſo in
thoſe that are ſuppoſed to be proper and
natural.

2. As for that Experiment it ſelf, ’tis but
a groundleſs imagination, and was never
yet conſirmed by any particular Experience,
becauſe ’tis certain the Event would be clean
otherwiſe, as ſhall be proved in the third
way of anſwering.

3. The third and laſt way of clearing the
Doubts in the ſixth Argument, is, by ſhew-
ing the like participation of motion, in thoſe
things that are in the open parts of a Ship.
To which purpoſe G allilæus urges thìs Ex-
11Syſt. Mun-
di. Col-
loq. 2. periment: If any one ſhould let fall a Stone
from an high Maſt, he would find, Lapidem
in eunde in ſemper Navis locum decidere, ſeu
conſiſtat illa, ſeu quantacunque velocitate movea-
tur: That the Stone would always deſcend
unto the very ſame place, whether or no
the Ship did move or ſtand ſtill. The Rea-
ſon of which is, becauſe the Motion of the
Ship is likewiſe impreſſed in the Stone: which
Impreſſion is not equally prevalent in a light
Body, as a Feather, or Wool; becauſe the
Air, which has power over them, is not
carried along by the ſame motion of the
Ship. Thus likewiſe will it be in this

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