Salusbury, Thomas, Mathematical collections and translations (Tome I), 1667

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1judicious diſcovering of a moſt lovely Statua in a piece of Marble,

hath ſublimated the wit of Buonarruotti far above the vulgar wits
of other men?
And yet this work is onely the imitation of a
meer aptitude and diſpoſition of exteriour and ſuperficial
bers of an immoveable man; but what is it in compariſon of a
man made by nature, compoſed of as many exteriour and
riour members, of ſo many muſcles, tendons, nerves, bones,
which ſerve to ſo many and ſundry motions?
but what ſhall we
ſay of the ſenſes, and of the powers of the ſoul, and laſtly, of
the underſtanding?
May we not ſay, and that with reaſon, that
the ſtructure of a Statue fals far ſhort of the formation of a living
man, yea more of a contemptible worm?
Buonarruotti, a
ſtatuary of
rable ingenuity.
SAGR. And what difference think you, was there betwixt the
Dove of Architas, and one made by Nature?
SIMPL. Either I am none of theſe knowing men, or elſe
there is a manifeſt contradiction in this your diſcourſe.
You
count underſtanding amongſt the greateſt (if you make it not the
chief of the) Encomiums aſcribed to man made by Nature, and
a little before you ſaid with Socrates, that he had no knowledg at
all; therefore you muſt ſay, that neither did Nature underſtand
how to make an underſtanding that underſtandeth.
SALV. You argue very cunningly, but to reply to your
ction I muſt have recourſe to a Philoſophical diſtinction, and ſay
that the underſtanding is to be taken too ways, that is intenſivè, or

extenſivè; and that extenſive, that is, as to the multitude of
ligibles, which are infinite, the underſtanding of man is as
thing, though he ſhould underſtand a thouſand propoſitions; for
that a thouſand, in reſpect of infinity is but as a cypher: but taking
the underſtanding intenſive, (in as much as that term imports)
tenſively, that is, perfectly ſome propoſitions, I ſay, that humane
dom underſtandeth ſome propoſitions ſo perfectly, and is as
lutely certain thereof, as Nature her ſelf; and ſuch are the pure
Mathematical ſciences, to wit, Geometry and Arithmetick: in which
Divine Wiſdom knows infinite more propoſitions, becauſe it knows
them all; but I believe that the knowledge of thoſe few
hended by humane underſtanding, equalleth the divine, as to the
certainty objectivè, for that it arriveth to comprehend the
ſity thereof, than which there can be no greater certainty.
Man
eth very well
tenſivè, but little
extenſivè.
SIMPL. This ſeemeth to me a very bold and raſh expreſſion.
SALV. Theſe are common notions, and far from all umbrage
of temerity, or boldneſs, and detract not in the leaſt from the
jeſty of divine wiſdom; as it nothing diminiſheth the omnipotence
thereof to ſay, that God cannot make what is once done, to be
done: but I doubt, Simplicius, that your ſcruple ariſeth from an
pinion you have, that my words are ſomewhat equivocal;

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