1the Earth is without the ſame, and owner of all thoſe motions that
in our ſeeming belong to the Sun and fixed Stars?
in our ſeeming belong to the Sun and fixed Stars?
SAGR. And theſe two concluſions, are they not of ſuch a
ture, that one of them muſt neceſſarily be true, and the other
falſe?
ture, that one of them muſt neceſſarily be true, and the other
falſe?
SIMPL. They are ſo. We are in a Dilemma, one part of which
muſt of neceſſity be true, and the other untrue; for between
tion and Reſt, which are contradictories, there cannot be inſtanced
a third, ſo as that one cannot ſay the Earth moves not, nor ſtands
ſtill; the Sun and Stars do not move, and yet ſtand not ſtill.
muſt of neceſſity be true, and the other untrue; for between
tion and Reſt, which are contradictories, there cannot be inſtanced
a third, ſo as that one cannot ſay the Earth moves not, nor ſtands
ſtill; the Sun and Stars do not move, and yet ſtand not ſtill.
SAGR. The Earth, the Sun, and Stars, what things are they in
nature? are they petite things not worth our notice, or grand and
worthy of conſideration?
nature? are they petite things not worth our notice, or grand and
worthy of conſideration?
SAGR. So that moving eternally, and the being wholly
veable are two conditions very conſiderable in Nature, and
cate very great diverſity; and eſpecially when aſcribed to the
principal bodies of the Univerſe, from which can enſue none but
very different events.
veable are two conditions very conſiderable in Nature, and
cate very great diverſity; and eſpecially when aſcribed to the
principal bodies of the Univerſe, from which can enſue none but
very different events.
SIMPL. Yea doubtleſſe.
SAGR. Now anſwer me to another point. Do you believe that
in Logick, Rhethorick, the Phyſicks, Metaphyſicks, Mathematicks,
and finally, in the univerſality of Diſputations there are arguments
ſufficient to perſwade and demonſtrate to a perſon the fallacious,
no leſſe then the true concluſions?
in Logick, Rhethorick, the Phyſicks, Metaphyſicks, Mathematicks,
and finally, in the univerſality of Diſputations there are arguments
ſufficient to perſwade and demonſtrate to a perſon the fallacious,
no leſſe then the true concluſions?
SIMPL. No Sir; rather I am very confident and certain, that
for the proving of a true and neceſſary concluſion, there are in
for the proving of a true and neceſſary concluſion, there are in
nature not onely one, but many very powerfull demonſtrations:
and that one may diſcuſſe and handle the ſame divers and ſundry
wayes, without ever falling into any abſurdity; and that the more
any Sophiſt would diſturb and muddy it, the more clear would its
certainty appear: And that on the contrary to make a falſe
tion paſſe for true, and to perſwade the belief thereof, there
not be any thing produced but fallacies, Sophiſms, Paralogiſmes,
Equivocations, and Diſcourſes vain, inconſiſtant, and full of
pugnances and contradictions.