Buonamici, Francesco, De motu libri X

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              <s>
                <pb pagenum="237"/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg1609"/>
                <lb/>
              cognitionem eius quod eſt, cùm per accidens, hęc autem eſt per ſenſum; tum per ſe, quæ iam per
                <lb/>
              cauſſam, & definitionem comparatur. </s>
              <s>Itaque ſi definitio naturæ tradita eſt, qua quid ipſa ſit ex­
                <lb/>
              ponitur, altera item quæſtio continuò videtur abſolui: ſic per eius definitionem cognoſcetur eſ­
                <lb/>
              ſe naturam, quòd ſi progreſſus à cauſſa demonſtratiuus eſt; etiam ad probandum, quòd natura
                <lb/>
              ſit, demonſtratio ſuppeditare videtur. </s>
              <s>Ad primam ſanè quæſtionem logicè fortaſſe reſpondere
                <lb/>
              liceat: ſiquidem progreſſus ex cauſsis eſt duplex, aut demonſtratiuus, aut logicus: ille quidem
                <lb/>
              primus eam habet vim, vt omnia complectatur quę pertineant ad cognoſcendum, cur res ipſa ſit
                <lb/>
              per ſe, & quoniam demonſtratio demum reſoluitur in definitionem,
                <expan abbr="etiã">etiam</expan>
              ipſa ſubminiſtrat præ­
                <lb/>
              dicata quæ pertineant ad quid eſt, veruntamen ea ſolius eſt accidentis, nec vllo pacto
                <expan abbr="ſubſtãtiam">ſubſtantiam</expan>
                <lb/>
              attingit, quemadmodum ſignificauit nobis optimè Alexander. </s>
              <s>alter autem ille progreſſus ab
                <lb/>
              Ariſtotele
                <emph type="sup"/>
              a
                <emph.end type="sup"/>
              nuncupatus eſt ſyllogiſmus logicus ipſius quid eſt, quo docebat
                <expan abbr="vnã">vnam</expan>
              cauſſam oſten­
                <lb/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg1610"/>
                <lb/>
              di poſſe per aliam, qui quidem ita vocatus eſſe videtur, quia proficiſcatur ex veris ſanè, ſed com­
                <lb/>
              munibus, ſi non, quia plura contineant: at quia cum tota rei ſubſtantia non adęquentur: at hic
                <lb/>
              etiam quoquo pacto pertinere videtur ad ſubſtantiam, quare dicet fortaſſe quiſpiam:
                <expan abbr="quæſtionẽ">quæſtionem</expan>
                <lb/>
              illam, quòd natura ſit, vtique à
                <expan abbr="demõſtratione">demonſtratione</expan>
              abhorrere, eum verò qui ab Ariſtotele fuerit vſur­
                <lb/>
              patus, eſſe logicum ſyllogiſmum. </s>
              <s>At verò quoniam approbo in hoc Alexandrum ex ipſomet
                <lb/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg1611"/>
                <lb/>
              Ariſtotele
                <expan abbr="teſtantẽ">teſtantem</expan>
              ad quęſtioneis ſimpliceis nullum prorſus adhiberi ſyllogiſmum, & id negan­
                <lb/>
              dum puto, quòd ad concludendum quòd natura ſit, logicus ſyllogiſmus fuerit vſurpatus, atque
                <lb/>
              id etiam, quòd cauſſæ ſyllogiſmo logico concludantur: ſed cauſſam è gemina ratione conſtare
                <lb/>
              cenſeo, altera quidem quæ res ipſa ſit, quæ vim habeat, vt ſic dixerim, efficiendi: altera verò quæ
                <lb/>
              contineat attributum, cuius ſit notio, vel communis ipſius cauſſæ, vel cuiuſque generis propria
                <lb/>
              in hoc autem progreſſu non inferri id quod pertineat ad ſubſtantiam, ſed cauſſæ attributum, vt­
                <lb/>
              puta, ſi concludamus, quia ſit enſis, fore neceſſario ferrum; non ex eo concludatur, ferrum eſſe
                <lb/>
              ſimpliciter, ſed ipſum eſſe cauſſam quampiam enſis, vel ex quo fiat enſis, & eius denique mate­
                <lb/>
              ria, & ſemper cum habitudine ad id cuius eſt cauſſa. </s>
              <s>Idcirco nobis alia ratio diſſoluendi nodum
                <lb/>
              hunc excogitanda eſt. </s>
              <s>Puto verò altero ex his modis euerti poſſe difficultatem, vèl quòd, neque
                <lb/>
              in phyſica noſtra, neque vlla methodo omnino natura, quia ſit abſolutè principium, vllo pacto
                <lb/>
              demonſtrationi ſubiicienda ſit, vel quòd oſtendatur de illa modus quo fungitur officio ſuo qui
                <lb/>
              duplex eſt, vel vt conſtituit ſubſtantiam compoſiti, vel vt præſtat in eo propria munera. </s>
              <s>
                <expan abbr="idq́ue">idque</expan>
              in
                <lb/>
              phyſica & prima philoſophia confici. </s>
              <s>Nam quanuis prior ipſa ſit cùm efficiens cauſſa, tum fi­
                <lb/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg1612"/>
                <lb/>
              nis: at non huiuſmodi ſunt abſolutè, neque vt ſubſtantia. </s>
              <s>Nam ſecundùm ſubſtantiam idem
                <lb/>
              ſunt finis, efficiens, & natura, ſi fuerint in materia, quòd ſi quatenus
                <expan abbr="admodũ">admodum</expan>
              efficiendi pertinet,
                <lb/>
              id eſt, fungendi officio cauſſæ generatim, illę ſint priores: iam non ſpectat id amplius ad oſten­
                <lb/>
              ſionem ſubſtantiæ, ſed attributi; & eſt quæſtio
                <expan abbr="cõplexa">complexa</expan>
              , non ſimplex. </s>
              <s>ſi verò fuerint illæ cauſſæ ab
                <lb/>
              omni materia ſecretæ, ſunt planè natura priores: attamen neque aliter eas tractari puto, quàm
                <lb/>
              in phyſicis, vt dant eſſe
                <expan abbr="cõpoſito">compoſito</expan>
              , & ſunt cauſſę, cur officio ſuo fungantur. </s>
              <s>Solùm magis vniuer­
                <lb/>
              ſalis erit conſideratio primi philoſophi. </s>
              <s>Nam verebitur fortaſſe quiſpiam primum
                <expan abbr="philoſophũ">philoſophum</expan>
              ,
                <lb/>
              quia ſpectet id quod eſt, quatenus eſt,
                <expan abbr="etiã">etiam</expan>
              demonſtrare poſſe naturam eſſe. </s>
              <s>Sed neque id atten­
                <lb/>
              taſſe puto
                <expan abbr="primũ">primum</expan>
              philoſophum; verùm oſtendiſſe quæſtionem
                <expan abbr="cõplexam">complexam</expan>
              , quæ contineret habi­
                <lb/>
              tudinem ipſius naturæ ad cauſſam primam. </s>
              <s>ſic igitur nullo pacto naturam eſſe demonſtrabitur,
                <lb/>
              neque id à primo philoſopho requiritur, ſed & ipſe ſemper cauſſas ſpectat ad compoſitum,
                <expan abbr="itaq;">itaque</expan>
                <lb/>
              notitia quòd ſint in
                <expan abbr="cõpoſitum">compoſitum</expan>
              potiſsimè expetit, & retundat,
                <expan abbr="quemadmodũ">quemadmodum</expan>
              ipſe quoque naturę
                <lb/>
              interpres Ariſtoteles 3. Eth. nos admonuit c. 3. Secundam verò quæſtionem confirmauit Simpli­
                <lb/>
              cius, & exiſtimauit ea quę de huiuſmodi quęſtione notata fuerint ab Ariſtotele, non abſolutè, ſed
                <lb/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg1613"/>
                <lb/>
              contractè fore accipienda. </s>
              <s>quaſi dictum ſit. </s>
              <s>poſtquàm naturæ definitio tradita eſt, ita noteſcit in
                <lb/>
              ea, quòd ſit natura, vt fruſtra rationes ad
                <expan abbr="alterã">alteram</expan>
              quæſtionem afferantur. </s>
              <s>Sed mihi cumulatè non
                <lb/>
              ſatisfacit hæc expoſitio, quòd reddens Ariſtoteles
                <expan abbr="rationẽ">rationem</expan>
              , cur hoc demonſtrandum non ſit, non
                <lb/>
              ita dicit, quia planè ex ſua definitione noſcatur, ſed quòd ſit per ſe notum, quemadmodum alia
                <lb/>
              multa, quibus ad aliorum oſtenſionem vtimur. </s>
              <s>Quò fit, vt credam naturam ſatis notuiſſe nobis
                <lb/>
              ante illam
                <expan abbr="definitionẽ">definitionem</expan>
              , neque alio auxilio indiguiſſe, vt noſceretur, quòd eſſet. </s>
              <s>Itaque mihi non
                <lb/>
              videtur eadem eſſe ratio notitię in iis quę cauſſas habent, & in cauſsis ipſis. </s>
              <s>Nam quæ cauſſas ha­
                <lb/>
              bent, aliquid ſunt pręter cauſſas, aliquid adiicientia ſuis cauſsis, & eſſentiæ propriæ, nimirùm
                <lb/>
              conditiones materiæ ſenſilis & ſingularis. </s>
              <s>quapropter in illis aliud eſt eſſe quod ſenſui ſeſe offert,
                <lb/>
                <expan abbr="atq;">atque</expan>
              id quod fluit ab eſſentia. </s>
              <s>Quamobrem geminę cognitioni obnoxia ſunt effecta, alteri qui­
                <lb/>
              dem quę per ſenſum eſt, atque alteri quę per
                <expan abbr="cauſsã">cauſsam</expan>
              ; at cauſſas ſic eſſe cognoſcitur, vt eodem mo­
                <lb/>
              do cognoſcantur per ſenſum eſſe, ſicut per definitionem, quia ſic cognoſcuntur in effectis, quòd
                <lb/>
              ſunt, & per effecta quoque definiuntur. </s>
              <s>At effecta cognoſcuntur quòd ſunt in materia ſenſili, &
                <lb/>
              definiuntur per
                <expan abbr="formã">formam</expan>
              . </s>
              <s>Itaque
                <expan abbr="nõ">non</expan>
              eſt idem eſſe quod per ſenſum cognoſcitur, & per
                <expan abbr="definitionẽ">definitionem</expan>
              ,
                <lb/>
              Sic ea definitio quæ tribuitur cauſsis ſolùm exponit & euoluit
                <expan abbr="eſſentiã">eſſentiam</expan>
              : nihil autem ad id quòd </s>
            </p>
          </chap>
        </body>
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