Buonamici, Francesco, De motu libri X

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            <p type="main">
              <s>
                <pb pagenum="9"/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg89"/>
                <lb/>
              quod non pendeat ab vtroque; mutuas enim ſibi operas præſtant. </s>
              <s>Verum quia non dubitatur
                <lb/>
              id, accidentiaúe valeant ad cognoſcendum quid eſt, quod philoſophus naturalis ſępiſsimè cogi­
                <lb/>
              tur vti demonſtrationibus à ſigno, hoc tanquam firmamento conſtituto, quæramus de modo
                <lb/>
              quo accidens id efficiat. </s>
              <s>Omnium ſententię meo quidem iudicio, ad duo capita referri poſſe vi­
                <lb/>
              dentur. </s>
              <s>
                <emph type="sup"/>
              a
                <emph.end type="sup"/>
              Nonnulli enim accipiunt proportionem inter mentem & ea, quæ mente comprehen­
                <lb/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg90"/>
                <lb/>
              di poſſunt, qualis eſt inter materiam & formam naturalem. </s>
              <s>Nam veluti materia non accipit
                <lb/>
              formas naturales ſine quadam affectione pręcurrente nimirum accidentium, ſic mens non po­
                <lb/>
              teſt, inquiunt, accipere formas intelligendas ſine pręcedente affectione, hæc verò accedit per
                <lb/>
              accidentia quæ mouent ſenſum. </s>
              <s>At verò præter id, quod incidunt in errorem communem,
                <lb/>
              quia putant albedinem à ſenſu cognoſci, quando cognoſcitur hoc album, neſcio vtrum mens
                <lb/>
              requirat eiuſmodi affectionem nécne: ſiquidem mens videatur eſſe poteſtas quę, vbi pręſens fue­
                <lb/>
              rit obiectum, è veſtigio operatur, & percipit. </s>
              <s>flagitat ſanè phantaſma, vt mens efficiens habeat.
                <lb/>
              </s>
              <s>quod illuſtret & intelligendum faciat, ſed vt afficiens, non puto. </s>
              <s>Namque ea quæ affectionem
                <lb/>
              poſtulant, docet experientia tempore quoque abſolui. </s>
              <s>Accedit etiam quod affectio præcedit in
                <lb/>
              eadem materia, in qua debet accipi forma. </s>
              <s>Sed mens per ſe non afficitur, niſi à re intelligenda,
                <lb/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg91"/>
                <lb/>
              hæc verò iam actu facta vt à mente efficiente, vt ipſi volunt, aut à forma ipſa ſubſtantia quæ per
                <lb/>
              ſe mentem informat. </s>
              <s>Nihil ergo præcedit in mente, quod afficiat mentem ad intelligendum.
                <lb/>
              </s>
              <s>Cui quoque rei ſignum eſſe poteſt quod vti affectio præcedat à minore tenditur ad maius, & ab
                <lb/>
              imperfecto ad perfectum. </s>
              <s>Atqui mens vbi percepit maius, multò facilius concipit
                <expan abbr="quoq;">quoque</expan>
              minus.
                <lb/>
              </s>
              <s>Docent alij ſic accidentia nos in notitiam ſubſtantiæ ducere, quia ſubſtantia non poſsit excitare
                <lb/>
              facultates cognoſcendi ſine accidentibus quaſi vtatur animus his accidentibus, vt ſic dixerim,
                <lb/>
              pro vehiculo ſubſtantiarum. </s>
              <s>Quæ item ratio videtur imperfecta; quia deſiderarem ego mihi
                <lb/>
              explicari modum quo, poſtquàm ſubſtantia per accidentia concepta fuerit, mens ſubſtantiæ no­
                <lb/>
              titiam conſequatur: vt puta, quomodo ex eo quòd Luna lumine priuetur, percipiamus cauſſas
                <lb/>
              & definitionem defectus. </s>
              <s>Itaque mihi videtur ita ſenſiſſe Ariſtoteles. </s>
              <s>Cùm globus ille prędi­
                <lb/>
              camentorum omnium, quod vocamus indiuiduum, pepulit ſenſus noſtros, & ex repetitione
                <lb/>
              facta memoria productum eſt vniuerſale, quod, vt alibi docui, concretum eſt vt album, quan­
                <lb/>
              tum, mobile, reſoluitur à mente in ſuas partes & illo inuento ſine quo cętera non exiſtunt, ſed il­
                <lb/>
              lud ſine aliis, hoc verò eſt ipſa ſubſtantia, ſiue vt primum excipiens, velut animus, ſiue vt cuius
                <lb/>
              eſt aliquod primum excipiens, vt animal, vt poſtea declarabimus, tum concipi ſubſtantiam.
                <lb/>
              </s>
              <s>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg92"/>
                <lb/>
              Huius autem reſolutionis duo fundamenta eſſe coniicio. </s>
              <s>primum analyticum quod traditur ab
                <lb/>
              Ariſtotele, cum docet
                <emph type="sup"/>
              b
                <emph.end type="sup"/>
              quemadmodum inuenienda ſint ea quæ inſunt quatenus ipſum. </s>
              <s>Nam
                <lb/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg93"/>
                <lb/>
              proponitur in primis aliquod inueſtigandum, eius vniuerſa attributa percenſentur, & vbi vnum
                <lb/>
              ex illis occurrat, quod ita ſe habeat ad attributum, vt eo poſito primò ponatur, & cum ſublatum
                <lb/>
              fuerit ſecum quoque perimet attributum, id dicimus ineſſe quatenus ipſum, & illam eſſe
                <expan abbr="primã">primam</expan>
                <lb/>
              cauſſam & eſſentiam accidentis, quæ prius elucet in demonſtratione, poſtmodo degenerat in
                <lb/>
              quid eſt, & in definitione ſumitur. </s>
              <s>Alterum fundamentum petitur è prima philoſophia. </s>
              <s>Quo­
                <lb/>
              niam accidens ita ſe habet ad ſubſtantiam, vt ad ipſam neceſſariò referatur, & ſicut vnum è rela­
                <lb/>
              tiuis ſuapte natura notionem affert alterius, ſic accidens affert notionem ſubſtantiæ in qua ineſt;
                <lb/>
              ac primum ſubſtantiæ, cum qua comprehenditur, vt album in cygno cognoſcitur, aut charta;
                <lb/>
              quia tamen non applicat ſeſe neceſſariò ad chartam aut cygnum; ſed ſine vtriſque percipi po­
                <lb/>
              teſt, non tamen ſine aliquo, notionem affert ſubſtantię ſimpliciter, ad extremum indicat illam
                <lb/>
              ſubſtantiam, cui perpetuò comitatur, vt ſine ipſa non exiſtat, & vbi hoc ſit, illa quoque adſit
                <lb/>
              oporteat, & per illam cæteris inſit, quæ vbi fuerit euoluta, per ſe ipſam patet, & ita lucet, vt acci­
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              dens quoque quod ex ipſa pendet, illuſtret. </s>
              <s>Quapropter ille progreſſus ab accidentibus ad ſub­
                <lb/>
                <arrow.to.target n="marg94"/>
                <lb/>
              ſtantias pertinet ad doctrinam confuſam & incohatam, cùm ceteroquin in doctrina diſtincta
                <lb/>
              & abſoluta accidens ex ſubſtantia cognoſcatur. </s>
              <s>Neque verò te intelligere velim progreſſum ab
                <lb/>
              accidente ad ſubſtantiam eiuſmodi eſſe, vt accidens prius ſine ſubſtantia cognoſcatur; neque
                <lb/>
              enim notio relatiui ab alterius notione ſeiungitur: ſed cum eo tempore ſimul cum accidentibus
                <lb/>
              ſubſtantia noſcatur accidentia præſtant, vt ſubſtantia per ſe concipi queat. </s>
              <s>Ita fit, vt ſubſtantia
                <lb/>
              & cauſſa per ſe poſt primam notionem, quæ auxilio ſenſus accedit, vt ens ſimpliciter accipiatur,
                <lb/>
              & efficiat primam ſubſtantię notionem, mox appareat, vt cauſſa, & ſic notionem complexam fa­
                <lb/>
              ciat ex qua principia demonſtrationis exiſtunt; vltimo accipiatur, vt quid eſt, & compleat defi­
                <lb/>
              nitionem. </s>
              <s>Sic igitur accidentia non proximè ſed remotè perducunt ad quid eſt, tùm quòd non
                <lb/>
              ſunt prędicata in quid, ſed ea ſignificant quę prędicantur in quid; tùm quòd per multos gradus
                <lb/>
              euehi, & regredi oportet mentem noſtram, vt aſſequatur ipſum quid eſt. </s>
              <s>Non omnia tamen ac­
                <lb/>
              cidentia conducunt ad huiuſmodi progreſſum: quippe quod ea, quę ſunt per accidens, ideſt, non
                <lb/>
              habent certas cauſſas ex hoc ordine deiiciantur. </s>
              <s>cùm enim certas cauſſas non habeant, ſolum af­
                <lb/>
              ferunt notionem ſubſtantiæ ſimpliciter, quia ſine illa nunquam exiſtunt, ſed nihil amplius, quod </s>
            </p>
          </chap>
        </body>
      </text>
    </archimedes>
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