Bošković, Ruđer Josip, Theoria philosophiae naturalis redacta ad unicam legem virium in natura existentium

Table of handwritten notes

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            evincit æqualis velocitas auri, & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">plumæ cadentis in Boyliano
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            recipiente. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Si reliquus curvæ arcus intermedius eſſet difformis
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            in diverſis materiæ punctis; </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">infinities probabilius eſſet, diffor-
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            mitatem extendi etiam ad crus primum, & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">ultimum, cum
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            infinities plures ſint curvæ, quæ, cum in reliquis differant par-
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            tibus, differant plurimum etiam in hiſce extremis, quam quæ in
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            hiſce extremis tantum modo tam arcte conſentiant. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Et hoc quidem
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            argumento illud etiam colligitur, curvam virium in quavis di-
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            rectione ab eodem primo materiæ elemento, nimirum ab eo-
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            dem materiæ puncto eandem eſſe, cum & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">primum impenetra-
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            bilitatis, & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">poſtremum gravitatis crus pro omnibus directioni-
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            bus ſit ad ſenſum idem. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Cum primum in diſſertatione De Vi-
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            vibus Vivis hanc Theoriam protuli, ſuſpicabar diverſitatem le-
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            gis virium reſpondentis diverſis directionibus; </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">ſed hoc argumen-
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            to ad majorem ſimplicitatem, & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">uniformitatem deinde addu-
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            ctus ſum. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Diverſitas autem legum virium pro diverſis particu-
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            lis, & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">pro diverſis reſpectu ejuſdem particulæ directionibus,
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            habetur utique ex diverſo numero, & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">poſitione punctorum eam
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            componentium, qua de re inferius aliquid.</s>
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            <s xml:space="preserve">93. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Nec vero huic homogeneitati opponitur inductionis
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              <note position="left" xlink:label="note-0094-01" xlink:href="note-0094-01a" xml:space="preserve">Nihil contra
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              deduci ex prin-
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              cipio indiſcer-
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              nibilium, & ra-
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              tionis ſufficien-
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              tis.</note>
            principium, quo ipſam Leibnitiani oppugnare ſolent, nec
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            principium rationis ſufficientis, atque indiſcernibilium, quod
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            ſuperius innui numero 3. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Infinitam Divini Conditoris men-
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            tem, ego quidem omnino arbitror, quod & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">tam multi
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            Philoſophi cenſuerunt, ejuſmodi perſpicacitatem habere, at-
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            que intuitionem quandam, ut ipſam etiam, quam indivi-
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            duationem appellant, omnino ſimilium individuorum cogno-
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            ſcat, atque illa inter ſe omnino diſcernat. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Rationis autem
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            ſuſſicientis principium falſum omnino eſſe cenſeo, ac ejuſ-
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            modi, ut omnem veræ libertatis ideam omnino tollat; </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">niſi
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            pro ratione, ubi agitur de voluntatis determinatione, ipſum
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            liberum arbitrium, ipſa libera determinatio aſſumatur, quod
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            niſi fiat in voluntate divina, quæcunque exiſtunt, neceſſario
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            exiſtunt, & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">quæcunque non exiſtunt, ne poſſibilia quidem
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            erunt, vera aliqua poſſibilitate, uti facile admodum demonſtra-
              <lb/>
            tur; </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">quod tamen ſi ſemel admittatur, mirum ſane, quam prona
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            demum ad fatalem neceſſitatem patebit via. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Quamobrem poteſt
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            divina voluntas determinari ex ſolo arbitrio ſuo ad creandum
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            hoc individuum potius, quam illud ex omnibus omnino ſimili-
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            bus, & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">ad ponendum quodlibet ex iis potius eo loco, quo po-
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            nit, quam loco alterius. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Sed de rationis ſufficientis principio
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            hæc ipſa fuſius pertractavi tum in aliis locis pluribus, tum in
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            Stayanis Supplementis, ubi etiam illud oſtendi, id principium
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            nullum habere uſum poſſe in iis ipſis caſibus, in quibus adhibe-
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            tur, & </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">prædicari ſolet tantopere, atque id idcirco, quod nobis
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            non innoteſcant rationes omnes, quas tamen oporteret utique
              <lb/>
            omnes noſſe ad hoc, ut eo principio uti poſſemus, affirmando,
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            nullam eſſe rationem ſufficientem pro hoc potius, quam pro </s>
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