Wilkins, John, A discovery of a new world : or a discourse tending to prove, that 'tis probable there may be another Habitable World in the Moon ; with a discourse concerning the Probability of a Passage thither; unto which is added, a discourse concerning a New Planet, tending to prove, that 'tis probable our earth is one of the Planets

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That the Moon may be a World.
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        <div type="section" level="1" n="27">
          <pb o="14" file="0026" n="26" rhead="That the Moon may be a World."/>
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        <div type="section" level="1" n="28">
          <head xml:space="preserve">PROP. II.</head>
          <head style="it" xml:space="preserve">That a Plurality of Worlds doth not contradict any
            <lb/>
          Principle of Reaſon or Faith.</head>
          <p>
            <s xml:space="preserve">TIS reported of Ariſtotle, that when he
              <lb/>
            ſaw the Books of Moſes, he commended
              <lb/>
            for ſuch a Majeſtick Style, as might become
              <lb/>
            a God, but withal, he cenſur'd that manner
              <lb/>
            of Writing to be very unfit for a Philoſopher:
              <lb/>
            </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">becauſe there was nothing prov'd in them,
              <lb/>
            but matters were deliver'd, as if they would
              <lb/>
            rather command, than perſwade Belief. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">And
              <lb/>
            ?</s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">tis obſervd that he ſets down nothing himſelf,
              <lb/>
            but he confirms it by the ſtrongeſt Reaſon that
              <lb/>
            may be found, there being ſcarce an Argu-
              <lb/>
            ment of force for any Subject in Philoſophy,
              <lb/>
            which may not be picked out of his Writings; </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">
              <lb/>
            and therefore ’tis likely, if there were in Rea-
              <lb/>
            ſon a neceſſity of one only World, that he
              <lb/>
            would have found out ſome ſuch neceſſary
              <lb/>
            proof as might confirm it: </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Eſpecially ſince he
              <lb/>
            Labours for it ſo much in two whole Chap-
              <lb/>
            ters. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">But now all the Arguments which he
              <lb/>
            himſelf urges in this Subject, are very weak,
              <lb/>
            and far enough from having in them any con-
              <lb/>
            vincing Power. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">Therefore ’tis likely that a
              <lb/>
            Plurality of Worlds doth not contradict any
              <lb/>
            Principle of Reaſon. </s>
            <s xml:space="preserve">However, I will ſet
              <lb/>
            down the two chief of his Arguments from his
              <lb/>
            own Works, and from them you may gueſs
              <lb/>
            the force of the other.</s>
            <s xml:space="preserve"/>
          </p>
          <p>
            <s xml:space="preserve">The firſt is this, ſince every heavy Body
              <lb/>
              <anchor type="note" xlink:label="note-0026-01a" xlink:href="note-0026-01"/>
            doth naturally tend downwards, and every</s>
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