Wilkins, John - A discovery of a new world : or a discourse tending to prove, that 'tis probable there may be another Habitable World in the Moon ; with a discourse concerning the Probability of a Passage thither; unto which is added, a discourse concerning a New Planet, tending to prove, that 'tis probable our earth is one of the Planets

Wilkins, John, A discovery of a new world : or a discourse tending to prove, that 'tis probable there may be another Habitable World in the Moon ; with a discourse concerning the Probability of a Passage thither; unto which is added, a discourse concerning a New Planet, tending to prove, that 'tis probable our earth is one of the Planets

Table of contents

[Item 1.]

[2.] Ex Libris James S. Dearden Rampside

[3.] A DISCOVERY OF A New , OR,

[4.] In Two Parts.

[5.] The Fifth Edition Corrected and Amended. LONDON,

[6.] The Epiſtle to the READER.

[7.] The Propoſitions that are proved in this Diſcourſe. PROPOSITION I.

[8.] PROP. II.

[9.] PROP. III.

[10.] PROP. IV.

[11.] PROP. V.

[12.] PROP. VI.

[13.] PROP. VII.

[14.] PROP. VIII.

[15.] PROP. IX.

[16.] PROP. X.

[17.] PROP. XI.

[18.] PROP. XII.

[19.] PROP. XIII.

[20.] PROP. XIV.

[21.] The Firſt Book. That the MOON May be a WORLD. The Firſt Propoſition, by way of Preface.

[22.] Sed vanus ſtolidis hæc omnia finxerit Error.

[23.] Solis lunæq; labores.

[24.] Cum fruſtra reſonant æra auxiliaria Lunæ.

[25.] Una laboranti poterit ſuccerrere Lunæ.

[26.] Gantus & è cælo poſſunt deducere Lunam.

[27.] Cantus & ſi curru lunam deducere tentant, Et facerent, ſi non æra repulſa ſonant.

[28.] PROP. II. That a Plurality of Worlds doth not contradict any Principle of Reaſon or Faith.

[29.] Æſtuas infelix auguſto limite mundi.

[30.] PROP. III. That the Heavens do not conſiſt of any ſuch pure Matter, which can priviledge them from the like Change and Corruption, as theſe Inferiour, Bodies are liable unto.

2917That the Moon may be a World. Before he thought to ſeat himſelf next the
Gods: but now when he had done his beſt,
he muſt be content with ſome Equal, or per-
haps Superiour Kings.

It may be, that Ariſtotle was moved to this
Opinion, that he might thereby take from
Alexander the occaſion of this Fear and Diſ-
content; or elſe, perhaps Ariſtotle himſelf was
as loth to hold the Poſſibility of a World
which he could not diſcover, as Alexander was
to hear of one which he could not Conquer.
’Tis likely that ſome ſuch by-reſpect moved
him to this Opinion, ſince the Arguments he
urges for it, are confeſt by his Zealous Fol-
lowers and Commentators, to be very ſlight
and frivolous, and they themſelves grant, what
I am now to prove, that there is not any Evi-
dence in the Light of natural Reaſon, which
can ſufficiently manifeſt that there is but one
World.

But however ſome may Object, would it
not be inconvenient and dangerous to admit
of ſuch Opinions that do deſtroy thoſe Princi-
ples of Ariſtotle, which all the World hath ſo
long Followed?

This queſtion is much controverted by ſome
11Apologia
pro Galilæo. of the Romiſb Divines; Campanella hath Writ
a Treatiſe in defence of it, in whom you may
ſee many things worth the Reading and No-
tice.

To it I anſwer, That this Poſition in Philo-
ſophy, doth not bring any Inconvenience to
the reſt, ſince ’tis not Ariſtotle, but Truth that
ſhould be the Rule of our Opinions, and if
they be not both found together, we may

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