Wilkins, John, A discovery of a new world : or a discourse tending to prove, that 'tis probable there may be another Habitable World in the Moon ; with a discourse concerning the Probability of a Passage thither; unto which is added, a discourse concerning a New Planet, tending to prove, that 'tis probable our earth is one of the Planets

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[41. PROP. XII.]
[42. PROP. XIII.]
[43. PROP. XIV.]
[44. FINIS.]
[45. A DISCOURSE Concerning a Rem Planet. Tending to prove That ’tis probable our EARTH is one of the PLANETS. The Second Book. By John Wilkins, late L. Biſhop of Cheſter.]
[46. LONDON: Printed by J. D. for John Gellibrand, at the Golden Ball in St. Paul’s Church-Yard. M.DC.LXXXIV.]
[47. To the Reader.]
[48. PROP. I.]
[49. PROP. II.]
[50. PROP. III.]
[51. PROP. IV.]
[52. PROP. V.]
[53. PROP. VI.]
[54. PROP. VII. PROP. VIII. PROP. IX. PROP. X.]
[55. That the EARTH May be a PLANET. PROP. I.]
[56. PROP. II.]
[57. PROP. III.]
[58. PROP. IV.]
[59. PROP. V. That the Scripture, in its proper conſtru-ction, does not any where affirm the Immobility of the Earth.]
[60. PROP. VI. That there is not any Argument from the Words of Scripture, Principles of Na-ture, or Obſervations in Aſtronomy, which can ſuſſiciently evidence the Earth to be in the Gentre of the Uni-verſe.]
[61. PROP. VII. Tis probable that the Sun is in the Gentre of the World.]
[62. PROP. VIII. That there is not any ſufficient reaſon to prove the Earth incapable of thoſe mo-tions which Copernicus aſcribes un-to it.]
[63. Provebimur portu, terræque, verbeſq; recedunt.]
[64. PROP. IX. That it is more probable the Earth does move, than the Sun or Heavens.]
[65. PROP. X. That this Hypotheſis is exactly agreeable to common appearances.]
[66. Quicunq; ſolam mente præcipiti petit]
[67. Brevem replere non valentis ambitum, # Pudebit aucti nominis.]
[68. FINIS.]
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That the Moon may be a World.

PROP. II.

That a Plurality of Worlds doth not contradict any
Principle of Reaſon or Faith.

TIS reported of Ariſtotle, that when he
ſaw the Books of Moſes, he commended
for ſuch a Majeſtick Style, as might become
a God, but withal, he cenſur'd that manner
of Writing to be very unfit for a Philoſopher:
becauſe there was nothing prov'd in them,
but matters were deliver'd, as if they would
rather command, than perſwade Belief.
And
?
tis obſervd that he ſets down nothing himſelf,
but he confirms it by the ſtrongeſt Reaſon that
may be found, there being ſcarce an Argu-
ment of force for any Subject in Philoſophy,
which may not be picked out of his Writings;

and therefore ’tis likely, if there were in Rea-
ſon a neceſſity of one only World, that he
would have found out ſome ſuch neceſſary
proof as might confirm it:
Eſpecially ſince he
Labours for it ſo much in two whole Chap-
ters.
But now all the Arguments which he
himſelf urges in this Subject, are very weak,
and far enough from having in them any con-
vincing Power.
Therefore ’tis likely that a
Plurality of Worlds doth not contradict any
Principle of Reaſon.
However, I will ſet
down the two chief of his Arguments from his
own Works, and from them you may gueſs
the force of the other.
The firſt is this, ſince every heavy Body
Ibid.doth naturally tend downwards, and every

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